Topics in the Foundations of Cognitive Science. What is a metaphysically and scientifically adequate characterization of mental states in general and cognitive states in particular? One such characterization of cognitive states argues that, in light of their essentially intentional nature, they are most satisfactorily modeled in terms of computations on representational states. This is the theory I call Representationalism, and there are strong arguments in its support.
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This banner appears on articles that are weak and whose contents should be approached with academic caution. Representationalism, or the representational theory of perception, is a philosophical doctrine that in any act of perceptionthe immediate direct object of perception is a sense-datum that represents an external object.
The latter is the mediate indirect object of perception. The term they used was not "sense-datum" but "idea. Representationalism is one of the key assumptions of cognitivism in psychology. Representationalism asserts that sense-data represent external objects — physical objects, properties, and events.
But this immediately raises a question: How well do sense-data represent external objects, properties, and events? At least sometimes, they do not represent them at all well.
It is often the case that our perceptions do not correlate well with physical reality. Dreams and imaginings can be considered representations in a way analogous to perceptions, perhaps, as recent fMRI studies have shown, using similar areas of the brain.
A problem with representationalism is that if it assumes that something in the brain, described as a homunculusis viewing the perception, this suggests that some physical effect or phenomenon other than simple data flow and information processing must be involved in perception.
This was not an issue for the rationalist philosophers such as Descartes, since dualism held that there is indeed a "homunculus" in the form of the mind. For those who doubt dualism, explaining precisely what it is that sees the representation is problematic.
But if representationalism is thought of as an explanation of how we indeed see, then it falls foul of the homunculus fallacy which would suggest that representationalism is either an incomplete or invalid description of perception. A further difficulty is that, since we only have knowledge of the representations of our perceptions, how is it possible to show that they resemble in any significant way the objects to which they are supposed to correspond?
Any creature with a representation in its brain would need to interact with the objects that are represented to identify them with the representation. A final difficulty arises when attempting to explain reference from a representational viewpoint.
One might wish to say it refers to the Eiffel Tower, but in the representational account we do not really see the tower, presumably the reference is to our sense experience. But this would mean that when I refer to the Eiffel Tower, I am referring to my sense experience; but when you refer to the Tower, you are referring to your sense experience.
Therefore when we each refer to the Eiffel Tower, we are not referring to the same thing — an apparent absurdity.Tom Rockmore (born ) is an American philosopher. Although he denies the usual distinction between philosophy and the history of philosophy, he has strong interests throughout the history of philosophy and defends a constructivist view of epistemology.
Scarinzi A. () Enactive Literariness and Aesthetic Experience: From Mental Schemata to Anti-representationalism. In: Scarinzi A. (eds) Aesthetics and the Embodied Mind: Beyond Art Theory and the Cartesian Mind-Body Dichotomy.
Abstract: Representationalism, in its most widely accepted form, is the view that the human mind is an information-using system, and that human cognitive capacities are to be understood as representational schwenkreis.com chapter distinguishes several distinct theses that go by the name “representationalism,” focusing on the view that is most .
Experiencing Emotions: Aesthetics, Representationalism, and Expression Rebecca Copenhaver & Jay Odenbaugh Department of Philosophy Lewis & Clark College 1. Representation has been associated with aesthetics (art) and semiotics (signs).
Mitchell says "representation is an extremely elastic notion, which extends all the way from a stone representing a man to a novel representing the day in the life of several Dubliners".
Pragmatist Representationalism Now it may well be true that the most philosophically efficient way of avoiding any intellectualist theory of belief (including religious funda- mentalism) would be to cut off the very possibility of correspondence, and deny that representations can be externalist (extra-textual) once their internalist.